The Veltman semantics yields a uniform soundness theorem, that is, all
are sound w.r.t. their corresponding class of
characteristical frames. So every derivable formula holds on every
characteristical frame of that logic. One can ask if the reverse also
holds. So if a formula holds on all
-frames, is it then
automatically provable in
? No uniform method is known to
settle this modal completeness problem and with every new logic a new
proof has to be found. The logics
,
and
are known
to be modally complete. The completeness proof of
of Dick de
Jongh and Frank Veltman is to be published soon
([dJV]). For a long time the modal completeness of
has been an open problem. In this thesis the question is
answered positively. All modal completeness results in provability
logic look alike a little. One works with maximal consistent subsets
of a certain adequate set. With these maximal consistent sets as
construction material, one makes up a countermodel for some statement
which is not provable in the logic. With any new logic,
one has to re-consider the notion of adequateness. Adequate means
large enough to do the required mathematics and small enough to have
the countermodel finite. So in one stroke one proves modal
completeness and decidability. (That is, if the logic is r.e. axiomatizable.) Miraculously this method work for most logics in this
area. In this paper a method is developed by which only completeness
is established without necessarily decidability.
Once this translation is introduced, one can ask for the logic of all
principles proved by
under this translation. In 2.2
and 2.3 we have already seen all the principles of
to
be provable under the translation *. But something stronger
holds. Solovay's first completeness theorem can be generalized to
interpretability logic to obtain the arithmetical completeness of
w.r.t.
.
Actually
is the interpretability logic of any essentially
reflexive theory. It turns out that also in this situation adding the
reflexion principle is sufficient to obtain a generalization of
Solovay's second completeness result. See [Ber90]. All
principles of
have been seen to be arithmetically valid in
every reasonable finitely axiomatizable arithmetical theory. We also
have
arithmetically complete w.r.t. any such theory. So
is the interpretability logic of
for all
as
every
is finitely axiomatizable.
We have a notion of reasonable arithmetical theory. For the time being
this notion can be thought of as
.
Up
until today it is unknown what the interpretability logic of all
reasonable arithmetical theories is. For a long time it was
conjectured to be
.
See [Vis91]. Until M0 was seen
to be arithmetically valid. Also in [Vis91]. Since then
has been conjectured to be the
interpretability logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories. From
now on we will abbreviate this target logic by
,
for general
interpretability logic. We will not write
as we do not
want to insinuate that we would know the relevant principle. A priori
it is not even known if
is axiomatizable at all! In this paper
the conjecture that
is
is falsified.
The definition could be generalized by fixing different sets of sentences instead of just
.
One can also translate
to an intensional formalization of ``T+B is
-conservative over T+A''. The logic corresponding to this
translation is the logic of
-conservativity. It is known that
is the logic of
-conservativity for any arithmetical
theory containing
.
If an arithmetical theory is
essentially reflexive the notion of
-conservativity coincides
with the notion of interpretability.